Bombs and morality

The universal notion of good and evil has been around a long time, yet it is easy to suggest that the concept is entirely subjective, depending greatly upon cultural and historical context.  ‘Evil’ is simply that which elicits feelings of revulsion, horror, and fear. ‘Good’, by contrast, inspires feelings of love, approval, and trust.  Thus, given the diversity of human experience and culture, what is perceived as good in one context, could quite conceivably be viewed as evil in a different setting.  The present conflict between ‘ISIS’ and the ‘West’ may be an example of this.

I don't believe in  the ‘good versus evil’ dichotomy, especially when used to justify political decisions. In the mouths of political leaders it becomes a rhetorical device that excuses knee-jerk reactions and lazy thinking. The ‘absolutist’ overtones associated with it are an obstacle to finding common ground across cultural divides - which is important in an increasingly connected world.  If one is to justify political decisions on moral grounds (which is what politicians are always trying to do), then it is worth thinking more carefully about what morality actually is, and where the boundaries between different types of morality lie.

To this end,  the work of social psychologist, Jonathan Haidt, is useful. In his book ‘The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion’, he identifies  6  foundations of morality for which there is evidence in most cultures around the world. These include  

1. care/harm

2. fairness/ cheating

3. loyalty/betrayal

4. authority/subversion

5. sanctity/ degradation,

6. liberty/ oppression

The world was outraged by the atrocities carried out by ISIS in Paris recently. The harm (1) caused was unequivocal. Supporters of ISIS justify it on the basis of other moral criteria, such as (2), which can be also be interpreted in terms of reciprocity, including the reciprocation of harm  - an eye for and eye, and a tooth for a tooth. ISIS claims it is repaying the West for atrocities it has perpetrated against Muslims (in Afghanistan, Iraq etc) and as such it is also invoking (3) which is about showing group solidarity.  Items 4, 5, and 6 are also called upon - the West has subverted religious authority (4), degraded the sanctity associated with that authority (5), and supported the oppression (6) of 'Muslim brothers' (notably Palestinians at the hands of Israel).

What then of the West’s position? What is the moral justification for bombing ISIS? Applying the care/harm criteria in isolation suggests that such an action would be immoral. It’s short and medium term effect will be to cause horrific injuries and large numbers of deaths, just as was the case with the ISIS attacks in Paris. Advocates of bombing may claim that this harm is justified on the basis of future harm averted, although there is little evidence to support this. Indeed, the evidence of recent history all points in precisely the opposite direction – that western military intervention greatly increases the scale of death and human suffering on all sides.  No political leader could honestly justify bombing Syria on the basis of  (1). Instead they must appeal to other moral criteria.

Revenge (2) has an understandably strong appeal amongst those immediately affected by the ISIS attacks, namely, the French. Fairness and punishment are often intertwined in the moral codes that govern human affairs. The French President, Francoise Hollande seeks active British support for the retaliation already being undertaken by French bombers, and, in playing the loyalty card (3) he has found a receptive audience in British Prime minister, David Cameron. Cameron, wants to use British bombs to demonstrate solidarity with the French, a group with whom the British share many common values. He is also appealing to (2) in calling for Britain to contribute it’s ‘fair’ share in the fight against terrorism.

The attacks in Paris are clearly a subversion of authority (4), and whilst bombs on Syria are unlikely to deter future subversions of this sort, they do at least give the appearance of regaining some control, which is important for those who believe that there is something intrinsically moral about the existing social order.  Insofar as liberal values are viewed as sacrosanct by many in the west, and given the extremely oppressive nature of the ISIS regime in the territories that it controls, moral authority for a bombing campaign might also be sought in (5) and (6).

What strikes me in thinking about bombs in this way, is how similar the moral arguments for bombing ISIS are to those that one might expect to hear from people who defend  ISIS. However, both sides seriously contravene what is in my view the most important foundation of morality, which is to care for fellow human beings and avoid harming them.

It is worth noting that moralities based upon group loyalty and shared values are fickle and dynamic. British solidarity with the French may seem appropriate now, but could quickly evaporate in the face of different challenges. The morality of punishment and revenge which is built on the foundations of reciprocity is currently very powerful. Yet, bombing punishes the innocent as well as the guilty, and is arguably the very response that ISIS is trying to elicit. Punishment is a weak foundation upon which to build a moral case for violence.

Surely, then, in any honest and genuine appeal to moral authority, the care/harm criteria must trump all others, unless there is strong evidence to suggest that adherence to those other moralities benefits the care/harm criteria in the longer term. In many cases it clearly does. Much harm would be done if people had no sense of loyalty or fairness. But in this case the evidence is very weak, and so too, therefore, is the moral argument for dropping bombs on ISIS-held territory in Syria. From a moral standpoint, Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the opposition, is absolutely right to stand firm against pressure to endorse those bombs.